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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and
Particularity: Why Are Some Courts in an Alternate
Universe?
Charles W. Murdock*
The focus of this Article is to suggest that the judicial decision-making
process is often not as rational and objective as we would like to believe.
Bias often affects the decision making of judges, sometimes to the extent
that it appears that the writer of the opinion is living in an alternate
universe.
As we progress professionally, and become more steeped in our biases,
we sometimes move toward creating a world that exists in our heads and
has little relation to the “real” world. While this assertion will be
developed in the context of courts’ interpreting “particularly” in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the Article first examines a
recent and highly significant Supreme Court decision, Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta.
The Article then focuses upon two cases, In re Spectrum Brands, Inc.
Securities Litigation and In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation,
to illustrate what I have called the “alternate universe” type of thinking
that some courts have employed. In these two cases, the courts have
either ignored or been unaware of sound management practices, the
existence of which would have supported the “particularity” these courts
found wanting in the pleadings. Some courts appear oblivious to both
the widely recognized practice of manufacturing earnings and the
economic incentives that exist for management to do just that. While
courts employ a presumption that senior management is informed when
applying the business judgment rule, all too often they also, in effect,
employ a presumption that senior management is not informed when
critiquing the specificity of plaintiffs’ pleadings. If senior management
is not informed about the economic situation of the company that they
represent to the public, representations which later turn out to be false,
what then are they doing that justifies the million-dollar compensation
packages that they enjoy?
* Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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The net effect of these two conflicting presumptions—that management
is informed and that management is not informed—is to eviscerate the
accountability of senior management for the misrepresentations it
introduces into the securities markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year’s Institute for Investor Protection Conference at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law focused upon Law and Economics.1
Lawyers, like economists, presume their profession is governed by
“rational behavior.” After all, don’t law schools teach their constituents
to “think like a lawyer,” that is rationally and objectively, unfettered by
emotional or other extraneous considerations? However, Daniel
Kahneman, a Nobel Prize winner and keynote speaker for last year’s
Conference, has argued that decision making by economists or lawyers is
not as objective, rational, or detached as professionals suppose.2
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman draws a distinction between
thinking fast—a quick, intuitive process predicated upon the
accumulation of vast amounts of information, often selectively retrieved
(the source of bias)3—and thinking slow—a deliberative, thoughtful
process that, unfortunately, involves the expenditure of substantial
energy.4
The focus of this Article is to suggest that the judicial decision-making
process is often not as rational and objective as we would like to believe.
Bias often affects the decision making of judges, 5 sometimes to the extent

1. A Law and Policy Research Institute, LOY. U. CHI. SCH. L. INST. INVESTOR PROTECTION,
http://www.luc.edu/law/centers/investor/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). Articles stemming from the
Conference included Daniel Kahneman, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Keynote
Address, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1333 (2013), Russell Korobkin, Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on
Legal Theory, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1349 (2013), Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What
Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1377 (2013), Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Finance Before Kahneman, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1341
(2013), Jed S. Rakoff, Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral Culpability,
44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1447 (2013), and Thomas Ulen, A Behavioral View of Investor Protection, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1357 (2013).
2. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 8–15, 203–04 (2011).
3. Id. at 21–22.
4. Id. at 31–34; see also id. at 39–49 (discussing the physiological and psychological effects of
expending mental energy).
5. Kahneman has an interesting study of parole judges in Israel and how their decision making
is affected by what he calls the “default” or easy option when combined with how tired they are.
Id. at 43–44; Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (the Same Way
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J.
83, 84 (2002) (also suggesting that judges have a bias in favor of disposing cases as early as
possible); see also PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE
CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 162 (1991) (“[D]espite all good intentions to ‘let the facts speak
for themselves,’ . . . cognitive response process[es] are all affected in subtle ways by one’s existing
point of view.”).
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that it appears that the writer of the opinion is living in an alternate
universe.
At this year’s Symposium,6 my PowerPoint presentation somewhat
irreverently illustrated the progression of some lawyers from a normal
citizen to esteemed judge as follows:
Evolution of Lawyers: Alternate Universes

As we progress professionally, and become more steeped in our biases,
we sometimes move toward creating a world that exists in our heads and
has little relation to the “real” world. While this assertion will be
developed in the context of courts’ interpreting “particularly” in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),7 let me first
examine a recent and highly significant Supreme Court decision,
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,8 which I have
criticized in an article published earlier this year.9
I will then focus upon two cases, In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Securities
Litigation10 and In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation,11 to
illustrate what I have called the “alternate universe” type of thinking that
some courts have employed. In these two cases, the courts have either
ignored or been unaware of sound management practices, the existence
6. INST. FOR INVESTOR PROT., LOYOLA UNIV. CHI. SCH. OF LAW, STRATEGIES FOR
INVESTIGATING AND PLEADING SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS CONFERENCE AGENDA (Oct. 25,
2013), available at http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/investor/pdfs/conference_broch
ure.pdf.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
9. See Charles W. Murdock, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders: The
Culmination of the Supreme Court’s Evolution from Liberal to Reactionary in Rule 10b-5 Actions,
91 DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
10. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
11. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger,
542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
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of which would have supported the “particularity” these courts found
wanting in the pleadings. The courts employ a presumption that senior
management is informed when applying the business judgment rule, but
then employ a presumption that senior management is not informed when
critiquing the specificity of plaintiffs’ pleadings. The net effect of these
two conflicting presumptions is to eviscerate the accountability of senior
management for the misrepresentations it introduces into the securities
markets.
I. ALTERNATE UNIVERSE THINKING AS PRACTICED BY THE SUPREME
COURT
Consider the following facts, which the Supreme Court accepted as
true in Stoneridge. The Court began by stating:
Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices
so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for cable
subscriber growth and operating cash flow. The fraud included
misclassification of its customer base; delayed reporting of terminated
customers; improper capitalization of costs that should have been
shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company’s billing cutoff
dates to inflate reported revenues. In late 2000, Charter executives
realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected
operating cash flow numbers by $15 to $20 million.12

What is the significance of the foregoing? The Court accepted the fact
that Charter was already engaged in fraudulent practices but, even so, was
concerned that “its quarterly reports” (most significantly, its revenues and
cash flow) “would [not] meet Wall Street expectations.”13
So what did Charter do? According to the Court:
To help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing
arrangements with respondents, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola . . . .
Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set top)
boxes that Charter furnished to its customers. Charter arranged to
overpay respondents $20 for each set top box it purchased until the end
of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return the
overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter. The transactions,
it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Charter would
then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its
purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted
accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its
auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected

12. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 153.
13. Id.
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revenue and operating cash flow numbers. Respondents agreed to the
arrangement.14

What do we know from the foregoing? In order to meet Wall Street
expectations, to wit, in order to avoid a precipitous drop in the price of its
stock, Charter and respondents concocted a scheme to manufacture
revenues and cash flow.15 Respondents, as suppliers, agreed with their
customer to overcharge the customer. Is this acting in the “ordinary
course as suppliers?”16 According to the Court, petitioner had sought to
assert a securities claim “beyond the securities markets—the realm of
financing business17—to purchase and supply contracts—the realm of
ordinary business operations. The latter realm is governed, for the most
part, by state law.”18 Was there anything “ordinary” about this fraudulent
activity? How can a rational Court look at a scheme in which a supplier
agreed, first, to substantially overcharge a customer and, second, to
purchase unwanted advertising, and then characterize the activity as
being in “the realm of ordinary business operations”?
Did this merely affect the price of Charter’s stock in some “attenuated
way,”19 or was the whole purpose of these transactions to affect the price
of Charter’s stock? According to the facts, the purpose of these new
arrangements with respondents was to enable Charter to meet Wall Street
expectations, i.e., maintain its stock price. Yet, in contradiction to the
facts that it accepted, the Court, to support its conclusion that these
fraudulent transactions were in “the realm of ordinary business
operations . . . governed, for the most part, by state law,”20 asserted that
the securities laws “do[] not reach all commercial transactions that are

14. Id. at 153–54.
15. After the fraud was discovered,
Charter was forced to restate its 2000 and 2001 financials. For 2000, this resulted in
reduced revenues of $108 million and increased expenses of $87 million. For 2001, this
resulted in reduced revenues of $146 million and increased expenses by $146 million.
Plaintiffs note that as a result, Charter’s reported growth rate for 2001 was reduced by
one half.
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506, 4:02-CV-1186, 2004 WL 3826761, at
*13 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004).
16. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 166.
17. Here the Court also misapprehends the nature of the securities markets. Basically there are
two markets: the distribution market and the trading market. While the distribution market (the
realm of public offerings) does indeed provide financing to businesses, the trading market—by far
the larger—enables those who buy in the distribution market to “get out” in the trading market, and
also provides the opportunity for subsequent trading in such shares. Respondents’ fraud was aimed
at the trading market. This market is not in the realm of financing businesses.
18. Id. at 161.
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id. at 149.
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fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”21
To say that the transactions only affected the price in some attenuated
way, when the whole purpose of the transaction was to affect the price, is
simply not rational.
Nonsensical as the foregoing statement of the Court may be, the best
example of alternate universe thinking by the Court is in its
understanding, or more correctly misunderstanding, of what factors
influence the price of stock.
When an investor purchases shares of stock, the investor is not buying
something like an apple or a car, which can be consumed or used, but
rather a claim on the future earnings of the business. Moreover, the hope
is that earnings will grow in the future. Thus, the value of a share of stock
is a function of the business model of the business, which in turn is a
function of the transactions underlying the earnings of the business—both
the magnitude and direction of such underlying transactions. And, for
companies with a high price-earnings ratio, substantial growth is
necessary to hold the price of the stock.
One approach to valuing a company posits that 1/P/E = CR = RFR +
β(MR – RFR) – G, where the discount rate (DR) = RFR + β(MR –
RFR).22 If the discount rate approaches the market return where β, or
volatility, is one, then a price-earnings (“P/E”) ratio of 25 translates to a
capitalization rate of 4%,23 and, if the market rate is 12%, then the growth
rate must be 8%.24 If earnings do not continue to grow, but rather drop,
this becomes a double hit to the price of the stock. Reduced growth raises
the capitalization rate, thus lowering the P/E ratio. Since the price of the
stock is a function of the P/E ratio and the earnings, when earnings drop
and the P/E ratio drops, there is a compound impact on stock price. That
is why you frequently see a precipitous drop in stock price, as illustrated
in Stoneridge, Spectrum Brands, and Silicon Graphics, the cases upon

21. Id. at 162.
22. See Cindy Andresen, Discount Rate . . . Capitalization Rate . . . Multiple. What Do These
Mean to the Value of My Company?, HENRY & HORNE, LLP (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.hhcpa.
com/blogs/business-valuation-litigation-blog/discount-rate-capitalization-rate-multiple-what-dothese-mean-to-the-value-of-my-company/ (discussing how “discount rate,” “capitalization rate,”
and “multiple” affect the valuation of a company). P/E is the price-earnings ratio; CR equals
capitalization rate; RFR equals risk-free rate (e.g., ten year treasury bond rate); MR equals market
rates (Ibbotson’s study of historic stock market returns); and G equals growth. Capital Asset
Pricing Model - CAPM, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capm.asp (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
23. Because the P/E ratio is the reciprocal of the capitalization rate, 25= 1/CR; consequently,
the capitalization rate is 4%.
24. CR = DR – G, or 4% = 12% – G; therefore growth equals 8%.
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which this Article focuses.25
The Court asserted that there is no authority for a rule that “in an
efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements
relating to a security but also upon the transactions those statements
reflect.”26 But that is exactly what investors rely upon. Assume a
company reports sales revenues of $2.0 million. What you then see is an
annual or quarterly report with the indication “Revenue $2.0 million” in
the income statement. As a caricature, that number could be a total
fabrication, or it could be the sum of a number of sales transactions.
Investors rely, not on some abstract number in financial statements that
reflects some fantasy, but rather upon the fact that the company had
numerous sales transactions aggregating to $2.0 million. In shorthand
fashion, we say that investors rely upon the integrity of the number, but
this means that there are underlying transactions that support the number.
The Court is effectively saying that when someone buys an apple, all the
person buys is the skin; the person does not assume or care whether there
is fruit inside the skin.
The Court also stated that respondents’ “deceptive acts were not
communicated to the public.”27 Yet, in its statement of facts, it
acknowledges that the purpose of respondents’ fraud was to enable
Charter to provide “quarterly reports [which] would meet Wall Street’s
expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow.”28 The
Court then adds that “[n]o member of the investing public had
knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts.”29
It seems to be well understood that judicial opinions are often written by
clerks.30 Let us hope so in this case; otherwise, it would be an
embarrassment for the Court to assert that a cause of action was denied
because the plaintiff did not know of the fraud. The plaintiff never knows
of defendant’s fraud. If plaintiff knew, plaintiff could not assert that he

25. See Tables at the conclusion of this Article for charts reflecting the stock prices of the above
three companies and the market drop in price after the misrepresentations of management were
disclosed.
26. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 160.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id. at 153.
29. Id. at 159.
30. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 5, at 84 (“[J]udges are known to delegate much of the
work of drafting their decisions to their law clerks, who are typically recent law school graduates.”);
see also The Cycle: Posner on Politics in the Courtroom (MSNBC television broadcast Oct. 28,
2013) [hereinafter Posner], available at http://www.msnbc.com/the-cycle/watch/posner-onpolitics-in-the-courtroom-57973827693 (interviewing Judge Posner, who stated that judges “tend
to not have a lot of knowledge about anything that is outside of legal books” and that “that’s a
weakness”).
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or she was deceived!
Distinguished legal scholars have asserted that “[j]udges are not
sophisticated thinkers about market dynamics” and “have little expertise
on matters of corporate and securities laws.”31 Such an assertion is well
supported by the inept analysis of the Court in Stoneridge.
What is particularly distressing about the inability of the Supreme
Court to understand that Charter and respondents had engaged in
securities fraud was the fact that, at the time of the Court’s decision,
Charter executives had already been sentenced to prison for having
engaged in the scheme to overpay for set-top boxes in exchange for
purchasing advertising.32
II. THE ALTERNATE UNIVERSE AND PSLRA’S REQUIREMENT OF
PARTICULARITY
With the Supreme Court living in an alternate universe, lower courts
can hardly be blamed for being out of touch with reality. This assertion
will be tested in the context of applying the concepts of particularity and
specificity.
A. Particularity in General
The PSLRA instructs federal courts to focus upon particularity in
pleadings in two instances. When plaintiff asserts that a defendant has
made a false or misleading statement, plaintiff must specify each
misleading statement and the reasons why such statement is misleading
and, if the allegation is made on information and belief, “the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”33
In addition, with respect to scienter, the complaint shall “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”34
In the abstract, who could quarrel with the requirement that pleadings
be specific and set forth particularized allegations? Nor could one object

31. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 30, at 89–90.
32. See Associated Press, Former Charter Executives Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/23/business/fi-charter23 (“Four former Charter Communications Inc. executives received sentences Friday ranging from 14 months in prison to two years
of probation for their roles in an accounting scandal at the nation’s third-largest cable television
provider . . . . The government said [former CFO] Kalkwarf in August 2000 gave money to
Charter’s suppliers of digital set-top boxes, asking them to charge the firm $20 more per set-top
box, then having them return the money as advertising revenue. As a result, Charter falsely
included more than $17 million as revenue and cash flow for 2000.”).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012).
34. Id. § 78 u-4(b)(2)(A).
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to the proposition that “[c]onclusory allegations that a defendants’ [sic]
conduct was fraudulent and deceptive are not sufficient.”35 But, as Ross
Perot stated when running for President, “the devil is in the details”36 and,
in the case of specificity, how specific must details be in order to pass
muster as sufficiently specific? Recall, the pleadings being examined by
the courts must meet the test of specificity without the benefit of
discovery.37
B. Particularity as Analyzed in Spectrum Brands
1. The Basic Facts
Consider now the allegations of plaintiffs in In re Spectrum Brands,
Inc. Securities Litigation.38
Plaintiffs alleged that Spectrum had engaged in illegal channel
stuffing39 in the fourth quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 by
giving customers, such as Walmart, deep discounts and other incentives
to purchase batteries, even when the customers were overstocked already,
in order to inflate the price of Spectrum stock.40
In press releases and conference calls with analysts, Spectrum touted
strong quarterly results, growth over prior periods, and earnings
exceeding First Call estimates.41 Some of these statements were
incorporated in the company’s quarterly Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) filings.42 In its annual and quarterly reports,
Spectrum represented that it recognized revenue “upon shipment to the
customer, which is the point at which all risks and rewards of ownership
of the product are passed,”43 and that “our general policy is not to accept[]

35. In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2006)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See Dallas Morning News, Perot, terming Clinton speech ‘very positive,’ is wary of details,
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 18, 1993, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-02-18/news/1993049236
_1_perot-clinton-dallas.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss,
unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to
preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”).
38. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297.
39. Illegal channel stuffing is the practice of “providing excess supply to distributors in order
to create a misleading impression in the market of the company’s financial health.” Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 2006).
40. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
41. Id. at 1302–04.
42. Id. at 1303.
43. Id. at 1304.
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product returns for battery sales.”44 Walmart was Spectrum’s largest
customer45 and plaintiff alleged that Spectrum “permitted some
customers, particularly Walmart, to return any product that they failed to
sell.”46 Notwithstanding these representations, Spectrum never disclosed
its practice of permitting some major customers to return unsold
product.47
2. “Robbing” Sales from a Subsequent Quarter to Enhance Sales in the
Prior Quarter
In dismissing the complaint, the court stated that “[p]laintiffs
present[ed] a number of generalized conclusory allegations,
supplement[ed] them with a few averments of specific fact, and, from that
mix, offer[ed] their conclusion that securities fraud occurred.”48 The
court added that “[p]laintiffs’ channel-stuffing allegations consist[ed]
only of generalized assertions regarding [d]efendants’ corporate culture
and business practices. Plaintiffs fail[ed] to identify any specific
transactions or communications to support their conclusory channelstuffing based claims.”49
a. The Allegations as to Channel Stuffing
So, let us look at these so-called conclusory allegations. This is the
first allegation analyzed by the court:
To induce SPC’s customers, including Best Buy, Menards, Wal-Mart,
Kmart, Shopco, and Toys R Us, to order unwanted product and to pull
sales forward into earlier quarters, SPC gave its customers deeper
discounts, longer payment terms, and credits towards future purchases.
The highest levels of management at SPC engaged in this channelstuffing.50

Standing alone, this allegation could fit the description of conclusory.
This is a perspective allegation with little factual specificity. But consider
this next allegation:
According to a former national account manager, K-mart stores had on
average between 52 to 100 weeks of Rayovac batteries, with some
stores holding 250 weeks of C and D batteries. This same witness stated
that Wal-Mart had 30–50 weeks of product in inventory and even
though everyone knew in January 2005 that Wal-Mart’s inventory
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
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levels and weeks on hand were way up, SPC continued to offer WalMart incentives to take additional product because “we needed to make
the numbers.”51

It is incredulous that the court not only would fail to find this
sufficiently specific, but also that the court’s ire would not be raised at
practices so totally antithetical to sound business practices.
Plaintiff further alleged:
Wal-Mart’s inflated inventory was confirmed by a former sales analyst,
employed at SPC during the Class Period, who recalled at least “30
weeks on hand” and stated, “We all knew what was going on, we front
loaded the stores in August and September 2004 for the Christmas
holiday.” This witness reiterated that executive-level management
handled every aspect of the Wal-Mart account because the Company
was so dependent on this relationship.52

With respect to the August and September shipments, what Spectrum
was doing was pulling sales that should have been in the 12/30 quarter
back into the 9/30 quarter. But even this form of channel stuffing would
not be sufficient to create thirty to fifty weeks of inventory. The channel
stuffing by Spectrum must have been massive. Now consider how the
court viewed the foregoing allegations:
Plaintiffs’ allegations as to Wal-Mart and K-Mart state that those stores
had multiple weeks of battery inventory [on] their shelves, but Plaintiffs
fail to allege facts to show that this level of inventory was unusually
high for that time of year, what special incentives, if any, were offered
to the customers, that Wal-Mart or K-Mart accepted the incentives or
bought additional batteries in response thereto, or to show any of the
other circumstances of the transaction.53

Has the court never heard of “just-in-time” inventory control? I have
grandkids still in grammar school that understand “just in time.”54
Walmart is regarded as one of the best-managed companies in the
country. According to TIME, “Walmart is supposed to have the most
sophisticated supply chain management system in the industry.”55 Does
this sound like a company that has “30–50 weeks of product in
51. Id. at 1309–10.
52. Id. at 1310.
53. Id.
54. The concept of “just-in-time” inventory control means that a company seeks to have
inventory delivered a short period before it needs to be available, rather than having an extensive
amount of expensive inventory in storage. This practice reduces the company’s capital or
borrowing needs. Otherwise, the company would need additional capital or borrowings to finance
holding higher levels of inventory. This would reduce return on investment by either increasing
capital or increasing interest expense.
55. Bill Saporito, The Trouble Lurking on Walmart’s Empty Shelves, TIME (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/04/09/the-trouble-lurking-on-walmarts-empty-shelves/.
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inventory”?56 Can you imagine any company, even a poorly managed
one, having 250 weeks of inventory,57 namely, five years, on hand? The
court justifies its conclusion that such an allegation was not specific by
asserting that plaintiffs failed to “allege facts” to show that this level of
inventory was unusually high for that time of year.58 To borrow logic
from the scienter area, is the inference that 30 to 50 (or up to 250) weeks
of battery inventory was attributable to seasonal demand as compelling
as the inference that the company was channel stuffing to manufacture
earnings?59
Moreover, if Walmart or Kmart had not “accepted the incentives or
bought additional batteries in response thereto,”60 how did they end up
with 30 to 50 to 100 to 250 weeks of batteries in inventory?
Another confidential informant testified as follows:
In another instance during September 2004, a former Channel Manager
recalled offering ShopCo an additional 30 days onto the standard
payment terms “because they weren’t ready to take their Christmas
inventory yet.” Rather than wait and ship the batteries under normal
terms when the customer wanted them, the Company enticed the
customer with promotional terms and discounts so that future quarter’s
revenue could be pulled back into the current quarter.61

The court found this allegation lacking as well:
Although this example identifies the time, the customer, and the alleged
incentive offered, it does not assert facts to show that ShopCo accepted
the offered incentive or responded to it by purchasing more product,
when such purchases were made, in what amounts, whether ShopCo
had an unusually high level of existing inventory in the first place, or
any other of the circumstances of the alleged transaction. On its face,
this allegation reveals legitimate marketing and incentive practices
engaged in by most companies.62

This is not a practice engaged in by most companies. When a company
offers deep discounts to a customer in order to pull earnings and revenue
from a later quarter into an earlier quarter, the company is moving toward
variable cost pricing63 or, worse, selling an item below cost. The net

56. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1310.
59. Cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007) (requiring
comparison of plausible opposing inferences in determining scienter on the pleaded facts).
60. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For a definition and explanation of variable cost pricing, see Mark P. Holtzman, Extreme
Accounting: Variable-Cost Pricing, FOR DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/extr
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effect is that, to pull “$X” of sales from a later quarter into an earlier
quarter, the company will realize less than “$X,” because of the
discounts, thereby lowering overall profitability. While this does not
make economic sense, this is a cost in order to manufacture the earnings
necessary to (temporarily) meet analysts’ expectations. This is simply
“mortgaging [the] future to meet monthly and quarterly goals.”64 If, in
the following quarter, the company does not meet expected revenues and
earnings plus the diverted revenue and profits, the company must again
play the channel stuffing game or then suffer the burden of not meeting
analysts’ expectations in the subsequent quarter. Eventually, the Ponzi
scheme must end.
The court concluded:
Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to show whether the alleged
channel-stuffing practices were widespread or anecdotal, whether they
involved hundreds rather than millions of dollars worth of product, or
how the alleged channel-stuffing transactions at the end of the quarters
differed from sales made at other times during the quarter. Without this
particularity, Plaintiffs have pled insufficient context for the
representations and omissions alleged.65

Once again, in what universe is the court living? From the foregoing,
the court cannot conclude whether the channel stuffing was “widespread
or anecdotal.”66 Plaintiffs had alleged that the company was dependent
upon its relationship with Walmart and that Walmart had thirty to fifty
weeks of batteries in inventory.67 Does this not create an inference that
the practice was widespread? Moreover, the question is not whether such
channel stuffing was widespread or anecdotal, but rather whether it was
significant. A build-up of thirty to fifty weeks of batteries is hardly
insignificant. Rather it is a major event.
And while the court wonders whether these practices involved
“hundreds rather than millions of dollars worth of product,”68 isn’t this
an irrational query in light of the fact that we are talking about a massive
amount of inventory held by a major (or the major) customer of the
company? Would truckloads of batteries represent merely “hundreds . . .
of dollars worth of product”?69 The court apparently has no idea of how
many batteries could fit into a tractor-trailer. I would advise the court not

eme-accounting-variablecost-pricing.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
64. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
65. Id. at 1310–11.
66. Id. at 1310.
67. Id. at 1309–10.
68. Id. at 1310.
69. Id.
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to enter a contest to guess how many gumballs are in a glass jar!
Moreover, when there is a massive build-up of inventory as delineated
in the complaint, it is likely that channel stuffing was a long-standing
practice. As indicated above, channel stuffing is a form of Ponzi scheme:
you rob sales from the second quarter (“Q2”) to enhance the first quarter
(“Q1”); then it becomes necessary to rob sales from the third quarter
(“Q3”) to enhance Q2. But the channel stuffing diversion in Q3 may
likely exceed Q2 because then Q3 diversion needs not only to replace
what was “robbed” in Q2 but also to enhance Q2. Like all Ponzi schemes,
Spectrum Brands’ Ponzi scheme came to a halt on July 25, 2005 when it
announced that “sales would fall woefully short of previous estimates.”70
b. Shipping Unwanted Truckloads of Batteries
But excess inventory allegations were not the only channel stuffing
allegations that plaintiffs set forth to support earnings manipulations.
Plaintiffs also alleged:
On the last day of the 4Q2004, a large tractor trailer truck full of
batteries was shipped prematurely to a retail customer, only to let it sit
in that customer’s parking lot for three days because they refused to
accept the product which had been delivered early. SPC recorded this
revenue in the 4Q2004 because it “shipped” within the quarter, but
management knew the customer would not accept the product at that
time since delivery terms had not been established for that time.71

To this, the court responded that plaintiffs failed “to identify the
customer, the approximate value of the product, whether the product was
eventually accepted by the customer, or whether it was returned to
Spectrum Brands.”72
This also is a tunnel vision response by the court. It is immaterial
whether the product was “eventually accepted . . . or . . . returned.”73 In
channel stuffing the issue is not necessarily whether a sale was made, but
rather whether it was pulled back into a prior quarter. With respect to the
value, again, does the court have any sense as to what a battery costs and
how many batteries can be contained in “a large tractor trailer truck”? It
has been said that it is more difficult to plead securities fraud at the
pleading level than it is to prove securities fraud at trial.74

70. Id. at 1317.
71. Id. at 1312.
72. Id. at 1313–14.
73. Id. at 1314.
74. See, e.g., John M. Wunderlich, The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-Fraud
Litigation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 749 (2014) (asserting that the motion to dismiss in securities
fraud class actions has been “transformed . . . into a significant barrier”).
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There were also additional allegations with respect to shipping product
not ordered by the customer. For example: “SPC sent five tractor trailer
trucks to a customer on the last day of the quarter, only to have them
returned full a week later after the customer refused the product.”75
Notwithstanding extensive factual allegations with respect to
inventory build-up at customers and shipping truckloads of product that
customers did not want, the court concluded, with respect to the
allegations:
Reviewing the allegations as a whole, they do not inform the Court
whether the alleged improper return practices were widespread or
isolated, whether any of the alleged return requests were granted,
whether the returns were completed, whether they typically involved
hundreds rather than millions of dollars of product, or whether the
alleged de facto return policy affected end-of-quarter sales any
differently than it did sales at other times.76

Again, recall that these pleadings are prepared without benefit of
discovery, often on the basis, as here, of confidential informants.77 Does
the court expect these informants to download computer files or convert
company documents in order to give the court the details it seeks? Isn’t
the court living in another universe when it expects this sort of detail at
the pleading stage?
3. The Requisite Particularity with Respect to Scienter According to
Spectrum Brands
Since the court held that the allegations of channel stuffing were not
sufficiently particularized, it also determined, inter alia, that this
precluded a finding that the individual defendants had acted with
scienter.78 But the court also went on to determine that sales of over
75. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
76. Id. at 1314.
77. Some federal courts, led by Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, have been wary of
the testimony of confidential informants. In Higginbotham v. Baxter International Inc., Judge
Easterbrook gratuitously and, I would assert, erroneously, concluded that information supplied by
confidential sources must be “discounted,” usually “steep[ly].” 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
According to Judge Easterbrook, “It is hard to see how information from anonymous sources could
be deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of plausible opposing inferences. Perhaps
these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps they don’t even
exist.” Id. This is another example of alternate universe type thinking. Judge Easterbrook has
more confidence in mind games, in which we weigh the strength of one inference against the
strength of another inference, than he does in the statements of real people. What confidential
informants testify to is fact, not subjective inferences. They may or may not be correct. That is a
subject for cross-examination. But, to suggest that they may not even exist is ludicrous. It would
be a very unwise attorney who would risk disbarment by creating testimony from witnesses that do
not exist.
78. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
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60,000 shares of Spectrum Brands’ stock, or more than 25% of the
holdings of one executive, for proceeds exceeding $2.3 million, were not
suspicious because of the “temporal distance”79 between the stock sales
and the July 28, 2005 announcement that sales would fall “woefully short
of previous estimates.”80 The sales were made within six months of the
announcement (on February 2, May 20, and May 23, 2005).81 However,
the court focused upon the “fact” that they had been made more than two
months prior to the announcement.82
This focus upon two months (sixty-one days) being significant, but
sixty-nine days (May 20 to July 28) not being significant, is another
example of living in an alternate universe. Channel stuffing often
involves bringing sales back from a subsequent quarter into a prior
quarter. By definition, the fraud will not be disclosed for ninety days,
plus the period from the end of the subsequent quarter until disclosure is
made. Thus, 100 days or more may expire between the time of the
wrongful activity and the indirect announcement of its existence by virtue
of lower revenues in the following quarter. If the channel stuffing
extends over more than one quarter, the time span between
commencement of the channel stuffing and the subsequent reduced
revenues will be even longer. Consider the multi-quarter channel stuffing
or Ponzi game described earlier.83
On the other hand, executives are generally aware well before the end
of the prior quarter as to whether forecasts will be met. And, if the
channel stuffing has been ongoing, the executives will know months in
advance that the house of cards they are building may eventually collapse.
Consequently, stock sales by an executive four months, or even longer,
before an announcement that forecasts are no longer being met are very
consistent with the conclusion that the executive is selling to take
advantage of the higher price due to channel stuffing. The blind eye that
some courts use to evaluate whether stock sales are suspicious will also
be explored in connection with Silicon Graphics.84
The approach of the Spectrum Brands court could be described as
failing to see the forest for the trees. It looked at each allegation and, in
nitpicking fashion, found some reason to find the allegation deficient.
Stepping back and looking at the totality of the facts alleged, it would be

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1316–17.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85–131 and accompanying text.
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hard to draw any conclusion in Spectrum Brands other than management
was purposefully engaging in channel stuffing to manufacture earnings.
III. PARTICULARITY AS TO SCIENTER: ALTERNATIVE UNIVERSE THINKING
IN SILICON GRAPHICS
A. The Silicon Graphics Facts
The facts, as alleged in Silicon Graphics, reflect particularly pernicious
conduct by corporate management. Silicon Graphics, Inc. (“SGI”) was a
“growth company,” trading at a high price earning multiple.85 As
discussed earlier, to sustain such a stock’s price, earnings must continue
to grow and a drop in earnings will have a compound negative impact on
stock price: earnings will be lower and the multiple applied to the
earnings will also be lower due to reduced growth.86
SGI, in July 1995, reported 45% revenue growth for fiscal year (“FY”)
1995 and projected similar growth for FY 1996.87 At this time, the
company also announced that it planned to produce a line of graphic
design computers (“Indigo2”), which it planned to ship in volume by
September 30, 1995, the end of the first quarter of FY 1996.88 The
company assured investors that the Indigo2 line would help sustain the
40% growth rate.89 These announcements caused the stock price for SGI
to reach an all-time high of $44 7/8 on August 21, 1995.90
Unfortunately, revenue growth for Q1 in 1996 was only 33%.91 To
counter a feared drop in the price of the company’s stock, senior
executives made a series of announcements over a three-month period
that the first quarter results were outliers and that the company would
achieve its projected 40% growth rate for FY 1996.92 However, in
January 1996, the company announced that revenue growth was much
lower than expected and the price of the company’s stock plummeted to
$21 1/8.93

85. The combination of earnings of $1.44 a share and a stock price of $44 7/8 reflects a priceearnings ratio of approximately 30:1.
86. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
87. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on
other grounds by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 981.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 982.
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B. The Representations by Senior Management That Later Proved to Be
False
In September, October, November, and December, senior management
made a series of announcements that the company was not experiencing
any supply problems and that the Indigo2 workstations were shipping in
volume. These are the September representations:
September 19, 1995: McCracken told Morgan Stanley that there were
“no supply constraints” on the Indigo2.
September 21, 1995: McCracken announced at an industry conference
that Indigo2 sales growth “was accelerating.”
September 22, 1995: McCracken told Morgan Stanley that “that there
is no problem with [Indigo2], nor is there an engineering halt.”
September 26, 1995: SGI announced “volume shipments” of the
Indigo2 workstation.94

In connection with its announcement on October 19, 1995 that firstquarter revenues had only grown 33%, which would likely cause a drop
in the price of the company’s stock, the company also assured analysts
and investors that the first-quarter results reflected only a temporary
pause and that the 40% revenue goal would be achieved:
October 19, 1995: SGI issued a press release reporting that the Indigo2
was shipping in volume.
October 19, 1995: In a conference call, McCracken and other officers
told securities analysts and institutional investors that SGI’s sales force
reorganization had been successful. The officers attributed the
shortcoming in first quarter growth to a “temporary pause” in OEM
sales, and a brief drop in demand from the U.S. Government and French
businesses. SGI assured investors that (1) there were no manufacturing
problems with or supply constraints on the Indigo2; (2) demand was
strong for the workstation, and it was being shipped in volume; (3) the
Indigo2 upgrade was on schedule and would be introduced in January
1996 as planned; and (4) the goal of 40% revenue growth for FY96
would be achieved.
October 19, 1995: McCracken stated during an interview that SGI’s
first quarter performance was “probably less” than the growth the
company would see during FY96.95

As a result of these representations, the price of SGI stock dropped
only slightly.96
In early November, the representations as to growth and shipping
volume were repeated:
94. Id. at 981.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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November 2, 1995: SGI officers held a press conference for securities
analysts and investors, stating that (1) SGI would still achieve its goal
of 40% revenue growth; (2) the failure to meet growth expectations for
the first quarter resulted from temporary sales force reorganization
problems and a temporary pause in OEM sales; (3) Indigo2 sales were
beating expectations, and the product was now shipping in volume after
some initial problems with the Toshiba ASIC chips; (4) development of
the Indigo2 upgrade was proceeding as scheduled; and (5) SGI’s second
quarter performance would exceed its first quarter performance.
Early November 1995: SGI’s first quarter report to shareholders
included a letter from McCracken stating that the Indigo2 “began
shipping in volume in September.”97

Following these announcements, there was an increase in the price of
the company’s stock from $31 to $36 to $38 3/4, and senior management
sold 388,188 shares of SGI stock.98
In December, when rumors circulated that SGI would experience a
shortfall in its projections and the price of the stock began to fall,
executives made the following representations:
December 15, 1995: McCracken and another SGI executive told Dean
Witter that (1) SGI did well in November; (2) SGI’s sales force
productivity was improving; (3) SGI’s sales to the U.S. government and
in Europe were likely to improve; and (4) SGI would meet its goal of
40% growth for the second quarter.
Mid–December 1995: McCracken and another SGI executive told
Smith Barney that despite sluggish sales, SGI would meet its goal of
40% growth.99

When these latter representations were made, the second quarter was
only a few days short of being complete. It defies reason to suggest that,
with only a few days left in the thirteen-week quarter (much of the
remaining time being holidays), the chief executive officer (“CEO”)
could truthfully assert that 40% growth rate would be achieved when, a
couple of weeks later, the company would announce that revenue growth
was much lower than expected.
The district court had held that plaintiff must allege not only the
misleading statements but also why the statements were inaccurate. In
this regard, plaintiff alleged the following:
• SGI’s North American sales reorganization had been unsuccessful,
resulting in diminished sales, below SGI’s targets;

97. Id. at 981–82.
98. Id. at 982.
99. Id.
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• SGI was unable to produce sufficient Indigo2 IMPACT workstations
to meet consumer demand or internal growth targets because it was not
receiving sufficient components from Toshiba;
• The components received from Toshiba were submitted without
necessary design verification tests, resulting in a low yield of usable
parts;
• SGI failed to qualify Toshiba to provide a sufficient quantity of
component parts, resulting in low volume production;
• SGI sales in Germany and the United Kingdom were materially
below expectations;
• SGI sales in France were much worse than expected;
• SGI’s original equipment manufacturer sales were trending
downward;
• SGI was at a competitive disadvantage with Hewlett Packard
because it could not ship Indigo2 IMPACT workstations; and
• SGI was at a competitive disadvantage with Sun Microsystems
because Sun products were better than SGI’s.100

The accuracy of plaintiff’s allegations was confirmed when, on
January 2, 1996, the company announced disappointing second-quarter
results and acknowledged that revenue growth for FY 1996 would be
much lower than expected. The price of the stock fell to $21 1/8.101 A
couple weeks later, the company’s management admitted to securities
analysts that the company had been unable to fill Indigo2 orders because
of a shortage in the supply of the computer chips.102
C. The Bases of Plaintiff’s Allegations As to Knowledge
The district court had determined that plaintiff’s allegations as to the
misleading statements and why they were misleading fulfilled the
requisite particularity.103 The case was dismissed, however, for failure
to adequately allege facts that would give rise to a strong inference of
scienter.
1. The Reports and Forecasts Prepared for Management
Plaintiff had alleged:
Each of the Individual Defendants was aware of Silicon Graphics’ fiscal
1996 forecast and budget and of internal reports, comparing Silicon
Graphics’ actual results to those budgeted and/or forecasted. Based on

100. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
101. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 982.
102. Id.
103. In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *8.

MURDOCK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

636

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:45 PM

[Vol. 45

the negative internal reports of the Company’s actual performance
compared to that budgeted and forecasted, the Individual Defendants
each knew Silicon Graphics was plagued by an inability to sell, i.e.,
ship, as many Indigo2 IMPACT Workstations as planned . . . .104

This allegation, however, did not meet the district court’s view of the
requisite specificity:
The Court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are not specific enough to
raise a strong inference of fraud. Every sophisticated corporation uses
some kind of internal reporting system reflecting earlier forecasts;
allowing plaintiff to go forward with a case based on general
allegations of “negative internal reports” would expose all those
companies to securities litigation whenever their stock prices
dropped.105

The District Court considered plaintiff’s allegations as to internal
reports to be “boilerplate” because complaints filed in other cases had
also referenced internal reports as being the basis for holding senior
executives accountable.106 But plaintiff’s allegations as to internal
reports were hardly boilerplate. The following are the reports, which
plaintiff alleged provided the senior executives with information contrary
to that which they were publicly disclosing:
SGI routinely produces at least three types of internal status reports: (1)
daily reports; (2) monthly financial reports; and (3) “Stop Ship” reports.
The daily reports include manufacturing, sales, and financial data.
Monthly reports are broken down into “Flash Reports,” which are
prepared immediately at the end of the month and which summarize the
company’s
performance,
and
“Monthly
Financial
Statements/Packages,” which are more detailed reports that SGI
distributes within ten days of the close of the month. “Stop Ship”
reports notify upper management of manufacturing problems and their
likely effect on volume shipments.107

2. What Should Senior Management Know?
Before returning to the court’s analysis, let us consider the foregoing
allegations of plaintiff in their entirety, but focus upon two aspects: the
shipping of Indigo2 workstations and the growth in revenues to support
a 40% growth rate. McCracken, the CEO of the company, on three
occasions in September stated that there were no problems in shipping
the Indigo2 workstations; in October he stated that there were no
manufacturing problems or supply constraints with respect to the Indigo2
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at *12 (ellipsis in original).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at *12 n.11.
In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984 n.14.
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workstations and, on the same day, the company issued a press release
reporting that the Indigo2 workstations were shipping in volume; in
November, the CEO sent a letter to shareholders stating that Indigo2
workstations began shipping in volume in September.108
With respect to growth, in October, McCracken stated that the goal of
40% revenue growth for FY 1996 would be achieved; in November, he
again stated that the company would achieve its goal of 40% revenue
growth; and, in December, McCracken told two different investment
bankers that the company would meet its goal of 40% growth for the
second quarter.109
Now consider the company itself. SGI was a highflying tech company
in a highly competitive environment.110 To maintain growth required
constant innovation, new products, or updated products. The company
had just announced that its Indigo2 workstations would add $1 billion to
revenue, almost a 50% increase.111 Does it not strain credulity to suggest
that, in these circumstances, the CEO of the company would not be on
top of the status of production efforts for the Indigo2 workstation? If
McCracken was aware of the production problems and denied them, he
is lying. If he was not aware of them and made the highly positive
statements that he did, he was clearly reckless. In either case, the fact of
making the statements, which were untrue when made, should suffice to
sustain a strong inference of scienter without any detail as to the manner
in which he obtained the knowledge of the manufacturing problems.
Now consider the allegations of the complaint as to the knowledge of
the executives, particularly paragraph 30:
A key management tool for Silicon Graphics’ top executives was
Silicon Graphics’ annual budget or forecast, by which the Company’s
Board, after input from top executives, set performance goals and then
closely monitored the Company’s actual performance, compared to
those budgeted and/or forecasted. Silicon Graphics prepared its fiscal
1996 forecast and budget by mid-1995 and then updated it thereafter.

108. Id. 981–82. In addition, at a press conference on November 2, 1995, held by the company’s
officers for security analysts and investors, the officer stated that the Indigo2 workstation sales
“were beating expectations, and the product was now shipping in volume after some initial
problems with the Toshiba ASIC chips.” Id. at 982. It is unlikely that McCracken was neither at
the conference nor knew of it and the representations that were being made.
109. Id. at 981–82.
110. As alleged in the complaint, “Silicon Graphics stock traded at a price earnings multiple
reserved for premier growth companies with track records of meeting market expectations for high
profit growth.” Complaint at 28, ¶ 34, In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639 (No. C-96-0393),
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1011/SGI96/001.html.
111. Robert D. Hof, SGI’s Rise and Decline, BUS. WK. (Aug. 4, 1997), http://www.business
week.com/1997/31/b35383.htm.
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Silicon Graphics’ fiscal 1996 budget or forecast, which included 40%+
revenue growth, was dependent upon Silicon Graphics obtaining $1
billion in revenue from its Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstation product
line and increased North American revenues resulting from a
reorganization of its North American Field Operations direct sales
force. Each of the Individual Defendants was aware of Silicon
Graphics’ fiscal 1996 forecast and budget and of internal reports,
comparing Silicon Graphics’ actual results to those budgeted and/or
forecasted. Based on the negative internal reports of the Company’s
actual performance compared to that budgeted and forecasted, the
Individual Defendants each knew Silicon Graphics’ business was not
performing as well as publicly represented, that Silicon Graphics was
plagued by an inability to sell, i.e., ship, as many Indigo2 IMPACTTM
Workstations as planned due to an inadequate supply of ASICchips
from Toshiba, serious and persistent problems with Silicon Graphics’
North American direct sales force resulting in reduced productivity, i.e.,
revenue shortfalls, weak OEM sales and weak sales in Germany and
France and thus Silicon Graphics could not possibly achieve near to
40% growth in the second quarter of fiscal 1996 or fiscal 1996 as a
whole.112

Would you consider this “mere boilerplate”? That is the
characterization given by both the district court and the circuit court.113
To support their conclusion that this was mere boilerplate, both courts
took judicial notice of the fact that five other securities class-action
complaints had also referred to “negative internal reports.”
This again is “alternate universe type” thinking. The creation of
budgets and forecasts, and the updating and dissemination of the same,
are sound business practices that should be employed by every company.
But, since every well-managed company employs such practices,
apparently, in the view of the courts, allegations as to the existence of
such practices becomes “mere boilerplate” and, thus, lacking in
particularity. Or, phrased differently, the court is presuming that senior
management is not informed about key activities of the company—the
antithesis of the presumption under the business judgment rule.
But paragraph 30 was not the only detail furnished by plaintiff as to
the internal mechanisms to keep senior management informed. The
circuit court acknowledged that plaintiff relied upon a series of internal
reports to keep senior management informed, to wit: “(1) daily reports,
including manufacturing, sales, and financial data, (2) monthly financial

112. Complaint, supra note 110, at 25–26.
113. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984; In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *12
n.11.
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reports, which included summary Flash Reports and more detailed
‘Monthly Financial Statements/Packages,’ and (3) ‘Stop Ship’ reports,
which notify upper management of manufacturing problems and their
likely effect on volume shipments.”114
This sort of detail as to the internal reports is clearly not boilerplate.
Nevertheless, it clearly was not sufficiently “particular” or “specific” to
satisfy the court. According to the court:
In this case, Brody’s complaint does not include adequate corroborating
details. She does not mention, for instance, the sources of her
information with respect to the reports, how she learned of the reports,
who drafted them, or which officers received them. Nor does she
include an adequate description of their contents which we believe-if
they did exist-would include countless specifics regarding ASIC chip
shortages, volume shortages, negative financial projections, and so on.
We would expect that a proper complaint which purports to rely on the
existence of internal reports would contain at least some specifics from
those reports as well as such facts as may indicate their reliability.115

Recall that none of this information is publicly available. Moreover,
the pleading must survive a motion to dismiss without the benefit of
discovery.116 Unless the situation of the company is so dire that it falls
into bankruptcy and there is a report by the bankruptcy trustee, 117 or the
situation is so egregious, as in Enron, that the board of directors
commissions a study,118 the primary source for information will be
confidential informants. Once again, does the court expect such
informants to misappropriate documents and computer records of the
company for delivery to plaintiff? Expecting the sort of detail required
by the court represents living in an alternate universe, divorced from the
reality of the real world.
D. The Alternate Universe Thinking Regarding Whether Stock Sales Are
Suspicious in Silicon Graphics
The unrealistic approach as to whether stock sales are suspicious has

114. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984.
115. Id. at 985.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012).
117. See Spiegel Bankruptcy Report to Be Released, AP NEWS ARCHIVE (Sept. 12, 2003),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2003/Spiegel-Bankruptcy-Report-to-Be-Released/id-e7b32a03
8fb87e5770839aa12ae0ea20 (describing the findings made by a independent examiner for the SEC
who uncovered illegal acts perpetuated by Spiegel Inc. leading up to its bankruptcy, which included
withholding negative reports from the SEC).
118. See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com
/wsj/docs/enron/sicreport/.
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already been discussed in connection with Spectrum Brands.119 There
the court held that the stock sales more than two months prior to the
announcement that sales in a subsequent quarter would fall “woefully
short of previous estimates” were not suspicious because of the “temporal
distance” between the alleged fraud and subsequent disappointing
results.120 But, as discussed, by definition, channel stuffing requires
more than three months before the effect is disclosed, and even longer
when the channel stuffing occurs over multiple quarters.121 To
understand this requires real-world analysis.
Similarly, the court in Silicon Graphics held that the sale of 388,188
shares of stock totaling $13,821,053 in proceeds was not suspicious.122 I
have extensively critiqued the naïveté of the court in another article,123
but it is worthwhile to briefly review it here in the context of alternate
reality type of thinking. First of all, the price range was from $36 to $38
per share, whereas the price dropped to $21 1/8 when the disappointing
second-quarter results were announced.124 Thus, senior management
avoided a $6 million loss. People have gone to jail for stealing much less.
An ordinary person would believe that there are six million reasons why
senior management might try to manipulate the price of the stock.
The court found that none of the sales by the six insiders were
suspicious. One person, Burgess, sold 75% of his shares for $8.7
million.125 However, the court did not find this suspicious because he
had acquired the shares when his company was acquired by SGI and
could not sell shares until after September.126 Thus there are two
plausible explanations: (1) he sold because he knew that the public
representations were false and the price of the stock would fall, or (2) he
sold because he wanted to diversify his holdings. But isn’t the inference
that he sold because he was aware of negative inside information just as
compelling as his desire to immediately diversify? The man on the street
would probably say yes; the Silicon Graphics majority said no.
Another insider, Kelly, a senior vice president, also sold a significant

119. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
120. In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
121. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on
other grounds by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
123. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption And the Complicity of Congress And the
Supreme Court-The Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 177–81 (2009).
124. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 982.
125. Id. at 987–88.
126. Id.
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proportion of his stock (43.6%), but he realized only $743,000, which
was insignificant when compared to the total amount of shares sold by
the insiders.127 Again, a lot of people have gone to jail for stealing less
than $743,000 and someone living in today’s universe would hardly
consider that “insignificant.”
Sales by the other four insiders were not considered suspicious,
because they only sold from 2.6% to 7.7% of their shares.128 However,
the court was able to come up with such low percentages by aggregating
in the denominator not only the shares owned but also the shares upon
which they had an option.129 If we look at the sales of the shares that
they had actually owned and paid for, the percentages rise from 16.8% to
79.7%.130
To minimize the percentage of shares sold by including in the unsold
shares the shares subject to options is again an example of alternate
universe type thinking. If the company is heading downward, and SGI
eventually went into bankruptcy,131 shares under option are worthless.
However, with respect to shares that have been acquired upon the
exercise of options, the executive has a sunk cost, which he or she will
lose if the price of the shares will plummet. Thus, there is motivation to
get out while the getting out is good.
Consequently, selling a sizable portion of that which you already own,
and for which you have paid the price, would again, for the man in the
street, create a strong inference that the motivation was to take advantage
of negative inside information.
IV. WHAT DO EXECUTIVES DO TO EARN THEIR MONEY?
Consider this from another perspective.
McCracken’s cash
compensation, in 1996 dollars, was approximately $1.4 million,
exclusive of the value of an option to acquire 200,000 shares.132 The
options were issued at a price of $27 per share and had an implied value
of approximately $4 million to $8 million, depending upon whether the

127. Id. at 987.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 986–87.
130. Murdock, supra note 123, at 179.
131. Peter Burrows, The Sad Saga of Silicon Graphics: The Final Chapter, BLOOMBERG BUS.
WK. (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2009/04/the_sad
_saga_of.html.
132. Silicon Graphics, Inc., Information Concerning Solicitation and Voting (Proxy Statement)
7 (Sept. 20, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/containers/fix020/802301/00
00912057-96-021047.txt.
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stock price grew at 5% or 10%.133 What do we expect a CEO to do in
order to justify such compensation? Is he or she entitled to be
uninformed? Is he or she entitled not to be aware of significant aspects
of the company’s operations?
In 1995 and 1996, McCracken’s compensation appeared to be above
average.134 For decades, CEO pay has been vastly outstripping that of
the average worker. See chart below:135
Ratio of CEO to Average Worker Pay (1965–2005)

In 2012, the median CEO pay for companies with over $1 billion in
revenues was $15.1 million.136 When CEOs are receiving 200 to 300
times as much as the average worker, it is not unreasonable to ask that
they fulfill their responsibility to direct and oversee the operations of the
company. It is also not unreasonable to expect courts to hold senior
executives accountable for being informed and for being aware of key
factors affecting the performance of their company.
After the massive Enron fraud in the late 1900s and early 2000s,
133. Id. at 8.
134. Two Decades of CEO Pay, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2012/12/ceocompensation-12-historical-pay-chart.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
135. Lawrence Mishel, CEO-to-worker pay imbalance grows, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 21,
2006),
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Phil%20108%20-%2007%20S/UBI%
20and%20RWH/CEO-to-worker%20pay%20imbalance%20grows.htm.
136. Gretchen Morgenson, An Unstoppable Climb In CEO Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/an-unstoppable-climb-in-ceo-pay.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0.
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Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002137 in an attempt to
constrain corporate corruption in the securities markets.138 Section 302
of the Act139 required the SEC to require by regulation that the CEO and
the chief financial officer (“CFO”) certify that they have reviewed the
annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC, that the signing officers
have established and maintained internal controls to ensure that material
information relating to the issuer is made known to the officers, and that,
based on the officers’ knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement or any omission to state material facts necessary in order that
the stated facts not be misleading.140
By the enactment of this provision, it was hoped that senior corporate
management would earn its salary, to wit, establish adequate internal
controls to ensure an accurate flow of information to the senior
executives. William Miller, former chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, in testifying about the need for a criminal deterrent for executives
issuing misleading financial statements, stated with respect to
wrongdoing that there should be a “high likelihood of detection and a
high probability . . . there will be serious punishment.”141 With respect
to the responsibility of senior officers, he stated that they are not auditors
but, with respect to requiring certification, we would expect that they
would “exercise due diligence . . . make proper investigation . . . hire
honest people . . . supervise them properly, and . . . involve themselves in
making sure that procedures are in place to assure that the statements are
correct.”142
Courts should expect no less.
However, courts have been wary of permitting plaintiffs to use the fact
of certification of financial statements as evidence of the senior officers’
137. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
138. See Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or Villain, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 525 (2008) (describing the corporate scandals that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its
provision, and the impact that it had over the first five years of its enactment); see also Steven A.
Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic
Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2014).
139. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
140. To get to the actual language, which the certification must follow, requires a bit of mental
gymnastics. You first need to go to Rule 13a-14, which will send you to form 10-K, Item 15, which
will then take you to Item 601 of regulation S.-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2013).
141. Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 327 (2002) (statement of G. William Miller, former Secretary
of the Treasury, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Chairman, G. William Miller
& Co.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg86740/html/CHRG107shrg867
40.htm.
142. Id.
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scienter. For example, one circuit court has summarized the appropriate
approach as follows:
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the interaction of SarbanesOxley and the scienter requirement for securities fraud claims in
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006).
The court rejected a reading that would permit a strong inference of
scienter from the certification alone. “If we were to accept [this]
proffered interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley, scienter would be
established in every case where there was an accounting error or
auditing mistake made by a publicly traded company, thereby
eviscerating the pleading requirements for scienter set forth in the
PSLRA.” Id. The court, however, went on to hold that such an
inference was proper “if the person signing the certification had reason
to know, or should have suspected, due to the presence of glaring
accounting irregularities or other ‘red flags,’ that the financial
statements contained material misstatements or omissions.” Id. This
interpretation of the statute is plausible.143

Here the court would only hold senior management accountable if
there were “glaring accounting irregularities” or other “red flags.” This
is a pretty minimalist standard for holding highly paid corporate
executives accountable. The expectation of due diligence set forth by Mr.
Miller would seem to be a more appropriate standard for senior
management to fulfill.
V. THE PREVALENCE OF MANUFACTURING EARNINGS
The instinct to manufacture earnings is well understood in the business
community. Over fifteen years ago, Arthur Levitt, the then chairman of
the SEC, expressed his concern:
Increasingly I have become concerned that motivation to meet Wall
Street earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business
practices. Too many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are
participants in a game of nods and winks. In the zeal to satisfy
consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path,
wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation.
As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of
earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing
may be giving way to manipulation; Integrity may be losing out to
illusion.144

143. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 555 (5th Cir.
2007) (emphasis added), quoted in Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 719 Pension Fund v.
Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 718, 748 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
144. Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N SPEECH ARCHIVES (Sept.
28, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
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One of the five prevalent techniques to manufacture earnings that he
discussed was manipulating the recognition of revenue—”recognizing it
[(revenue)] before a sale is complete, before the product is delivered to a
customer, or at a time when the customer still has options to terminate,
void or delay the sale.”145 This is what Spectrum Brands was doing.
Data reported by CFO Magazine supports former chairman Levitt’s
concern that manipulating earnings may be widespread. As the chart
below indicates, over half of CFOs indicated that, with only a month left
in the fiscal year, they could move reported earnings by 3% to 5%, or
more:146
Scope of CEOs' Influence Over Reported Earnings*
*With one month left in the reporting year
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Isn’t the practice of manufacturing earnings something of which
federal courts should be aware, since they frequently deal with cases
involving financial considerations? Could they not take judicial notice
of this practice so as to inform their consideration of whether allegations
are sufficiently particular? Could they not take judicial notice of the fact
that a truckload of batteries is worth tens of thousands of dollars, not
hundreds of dollars?

145. Id.
146. Don Durfee, Management or Manipulation?, CFO MAG. (Dec. 1, 2006), http://ww2.
cfo.com/accounting-tax/2006/12/management-or-manipulation/.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S INSTRUCTION TO CONSIDER THE FOREST, NOT
JUST THE TREES
A year after Spectrum Brands was decided, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. where it
held that, in order to plead a strong inference of scienter, the inference
must be “cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.”147
However, the Court also instructed that “courts must consider the
complaint in its entirety,” including “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court could take judicial
reference.”148 In other words, do not focus merely on some individual
trees but take a look at the forest as a whole. And, in the case of Spectrum
Brands, could not the court take notice of the fact that major retailers
implement “just-in-time” inventory practices?
The Supreme Court has also observed that “individual pieces of
evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation
prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than
its constituent parts.”149
While the instruction of the Supreme Court should have tempered
courts in relying upon Spectrum Brands, the case is still “alive and well.”
The court, in City of Omaha Police & Fire Retirement System v. The
Timberland Co.,150 quoted Spectrum Brands’ statement that the
allegation that customer “stores had multiple weeks of . . . inventory on
their shelves” insufficient where the complaint failed to further allege that
“this level of inventory was unusually high for that time of year.”151
However, in Timberland, plaintiffs’ allegations were not nearly as
specific as those in Spectrum Brands and the court was not unreasonable
in seeking more detail. It may be that the difference between the two
cases was in the recall capabilities of the confidential witnesses.
VII. CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS: EXECUTIVES ARE INFORMED VERSUS
EXECUTIVES ARE NOT INFORMED
What is paradoxical about the approach of many courts is that they
indulge two conflicting presumptions whose common thread is to insulate
executives from liability and undercut corporate accountability.

147. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
148. Id. at 322.
149. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179–80 (1987).
150. City of Omaha Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Timberland Co., No. 11-CV-277-SM, 2013 WL
1314426 (D.N.H. Mar. 28, 2013).
151. Id. at *13 (quoting In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1310
(N.D. Ga. 2006)).
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Spectrum Brands, by condoning channel stuffing, by assuming that senior
executives were unaware of the practice, and by determining that a sale
of $2.3 million of stock was not sufficiently suspicious to infer scienter
(because more than two months intervened between the sale of the stock
and the announcement that “sales would fall woefully short of previous
estimates),152 thereby presumed that senior management was not aware
of core business operations.
Moreover, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Securities Litigation,153 was
even more egregious in essentially indulging a presumption that senior
corporate executives were uninformed. In Silicon Graphics, the court
explicitly relied upon the business judgment rule in one part of the
opinion. The rule, as the court stated, is a presumption that senior
executives are informed: “Under the business judgment rule, directors are
presumed to make sound business decisions, and to inform themselves
properly prior to making those decisions.”154
On the other hand, in the bulk of the opinion, the court essentially
presumed that senior executives were not informed. As discussed below,
plaintiff’s allegations that there were internal reports which described
serious supply problems and the inability to ship product155 did not,
according to the court, create an inference that senior management was
reckless when senior managers made statements that the product was
shipping in volume and that there were no supply problems.156 In other
words, the court presumed that the executives were not informed about
dramatic events that would, when acknowledged a couple of months later,
cause a precipitous drop in the price of the company shares. 157 The
announcement of actual results confirmed that the executives had lied
about the company’s situation.158
The two presumptions—that executives are informed and that
executives are not informed—are obviously antithetical to each other.
The net effect of the presumptions, unfortunately, is that they withhold
judicial scrutiny of the actions of corporate executives and encourage

152. In re Spectrum Brands, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
153. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on
other grounds by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008). The rise and fall
of SGI is described in Robert D. Hof, The Sad Saga of Silicon Graphics, BUS. WK. (Aug. 4, 1997),
http://www.businessweek.com/1997/31/b35381.htm.
154. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 990 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del.
1988)).
155. Id. at 980–82.
156. Id. at 988.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 982.
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reckless behavior.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that judges “tend not to have a lot of knowledge about
anything that is outside of legal books”159 is clearly a weakness. But if
judges are going to deal with financial matters, they ought to familiarize
themselves with concepts such as “just-in-time inventory,” and they
should appreciate that high P/E ratio companies need to achieve high
growth rates that are difficult to maintain. With so much of executive
compensation tied to the price of the employer’s stock, courts should also
have sufficient understanding of human nature to realize that a strong
temptation may exist to manipulate the price of a company’s stock—a
practice that former SEC Chairman Levitt cautioned about fifteen years
ago.
Courts also need to understand that, in exchange for multi-milliondollar salaries, senior management is expected to fulfill its oversight
responsibilities by doing due diligence. Sarbanes-Oxley mandated a
functioning system of internal controls which the CEO and CFO were
required to certify. Even without this mandate, in order to manage a
company competently, there needs to be a system of weekly and monthly
reports to keep senior management informed. If such a system is in place,
then courts should recognize that, when public disclosures turn out to be
false, there is a strong inference that senior management was reckless, if
not lying. If there is no such system in place, then senior managers are
reckless in making aggressive statements that turn out not to be true.
In addition, courts need to appreciate the paradox created when, often
in the same case, they apply the business judgment rule which presumes
that senior management is informed and making thoughtful decisions,
while also rejecting an inference that senior management is aware of
situations within the company that repudiate public statements as to the
condition of the company. Management cannot be both informed and
uninformed.
But the problem is not just a lack of knowledge by many courts, but a
bias160 in favor of management. Recent studies have indicated that half
159. Posner, supra note 30.
160. Bias is not used here in the pejorative sense of evil motivation, but rather the underlying
beliefs and attitudes which we hold and which bear upon our interpretation of the so-called “facts.”
See, e.g., PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE
AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 162 (1991). The authors note:
But despite all good intentions to “let the facts speak for themselves,” biases based
on our existing attitudes can sneak into our perception and interpretation of the
“facts.” What we notice in a message, how we interpret ambiguous message
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the members of Congress are millionaires.161 While there are
undoubtedly few judges in that category, judges tend to come from the
elite ranks of an elite profession. While they have neither contact with
nor empathy for drug defendants who come before them, they may well
live near the white-collar defendants who were sued in securities cases
and they certainly have similar educational and cultural backgrounds.
But, as the tables in this Article demonstrate, when management lies or
tells half-truths, and the investing public is deceived, this is not a
victimless crime.
The PSLRA does require averments to be made with particularity.
And “particular” does not mean “general” or “vague.” But while the
PSLRA may have been sparked by concern over vexatious litigation, the
PSLRA is part of the securities laws that were enacted to “insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets,”162 to guard against
“manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of securities
prices,”163 and “for the protection of investors,”164 not for the protection
of management. Moreover, as the article by Wendy Couture165
demonstrates, concern about the vexatiousness of securities litigation
may be overblown.
Professor Bainbridge has developed the proposition that courts like to
employ heuristics to resolve litigation at the earliest possible point. 166
Courts, in interpreting “particularity,” like to employ the “who, what,
when, where, and how” test.167 But unrealistic, nitpicking application of
this approach, focusing on the trees but not the forest—in other words the
alternate universe approach—undercuts the purposes and policies of the
securities laws, and eviscerates management accountability in the
corporate sphere.

information, and which beliefs in knowledge are conjured from memory during the
cognitive response process are all affected in subtle ways by one’s existing point of
view.
Id.
161. Eric Lipton, Half of Congress Members Are Millionaires, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/us/politics/more-than-half-the-members-of-congre
ss-are-millionaires-analysis-finds.html?_r=0.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
163. Id. § 78b(4).
164. Id. § 78j(b).
165. Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in Eighty Motions to
Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (2014).
166. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 30, at 108.
167. E.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 998 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated
on other grounds by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
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